[3] "U.S. Giving Up Canal; Agrees to Scrap Panama Pact, Write New One," *Chicago Tribune*, September 25, 1965, pp. 1, 2.

[4] "The Panama Canal—It Must Remain American," by Dr. Charles Callan Tansill (Committee on Pan-American Policy, 60 East 42nd Street, New York, New York 10017; price: 15¢), 12 pp.

[From the Dan Smoot Report, Dallas, Tex., Nov. 1, 1966]

OUR FLAG IS COMING DOWN IN PANAMA

Present U.S.-Panama negotiations of a new treaty (to meet demands of Panama politicians and of international communism that the U. S. surrender sovereignty over the Panama Canal Zone) were initiated by President Johnson as a result of the bloody Panama riots in January, 1964. Those riots were precipitated by Panama mobs protesting because American students raised an American flag, at an American high school, in the American Canal Zone. Here are excerpts from a contemporary log kept by a La Crosse, Wisconsin, radio commentator who was in Panama as a tourist at the time of the riots:

"The Canal Zone radio went off the air at 11 last night. . . . The radio announcers [on Panama stations outside the American Canal Zone] are screaming at the top of their lungs . . . 'to kill all the Americans you see.' Thelma King, a deputado (congress-woman) and Communist, screaming for two hours on the radio and loudspeakers in the city—to hunt out all the Americans and butcher them in the streets. . . .

"All kinds of armament . . . in the hands of the mob: pistols, clubs, Molotov cocktails. . . . Snipers previously posted on the surrounding rooftops . . . [firing] with rifles at the [American Canal Zone] police. . . . The looters . . . running in mobs . . . looking in the streets and in windows for Americans to kill. . . .

"Then they atatcked the U. S. Embassay. We . . . phoned there, and were told to hang up as they were busy evacuating. So, there we were—no protection, and it appeared the U. S. didn't give a damn about us. . . .

"A show of force any time during this anti-American Red-inspired riot would have brought a quick end . . . and saved how many American lives? How many Americans are now dead in their apartments, or torn to pieces and hacked to bits? How many are dead in the outside villages hanging from trees and lamp posts? How many? . . . We know for sure the Panamanians hanged five Americans. Cut one more up in little pieces with machetes. This news . . . has been classified as secret and the . . . classifying is being done by our own government. . . ." [1]

All fighting in which Americans were involved occurred inside our Canal Zone where American troops were trying to protect American lives and American property from foreign mobs which had invaded American soil. Nonetheless, the Panama President accused the United States of "aggression," and broke diplomatic relations saying he would not resume relations until the U.S. promised to renegotiate U.S.-Panama treaties.

President Johnson said he would not yield to force and that violence was no basis for talks; yet, he rushed Thomas Mann to Panama for talks. On January 23, 1964, Johnson made an appeal for Panama to restore diplomatic relations with us, promising to discuss or renegotiate anything. Commenting on the riots, Johnson placed as much blame on American youngsters who had raised an American flag as on communist-led Panama mobs who had murdered, vandalized, and pillaged for more than a week.[2]

On March 21, 1964, Johnson sent Panama another conciliatory message re-emphasizing his willingness to discuss anything desired by Panama.

On April 3, 1964, Johnson resumed diplomatic relations with Panama—on Panama's terms—and began negotiations for "prompt elimination of the causes of conflict between the two countries, without limitations or preconditions of any kind." [3]

On April 5, 1964, when General Douglas MacArthur died, the American and Panama flags were lowered to half-mast in our Canal Zone. A few Panama "students" objected. The U.S. State Department, on orders from Johnson, had the Panama flag raised to full staff, above the American flag—in defiance of American military regulations, which forbid the flying of *any* flag above ours on American soil or at any American military installation.[4]

On July 10, 1964, an Alliance for Progress team submitted *to the government of Panama* a report saying that Panama should be given a more important role in the operation of the Canal; that Panamanians should be promoted to positions of high responsibility in the Canal organization; and that the U.S. should return to Panama all land in the Canal Zone that is not indispensable for maintenance, defense, and sanitation of the Canal.[5] Alliance for Progress is the organization which dispenses United States tax money to Panama and other Latin American countries.

On July 15, 1964, the government of Panama released a report revealing its future plans for the Canal Zone. Among other things, Panama will force all Canal Zone residents (Panamanians and non-Panamanians alike) to move out. This will require them to live somewhere in the Republic of Panama where the government of Panama can levy income taxes on them. This plan is supported, in part, by the Alliance for Progress. [6]

On December 18, 1964, President Johnson—with the election safely behind him—announced that he would negotiate a new treaty to recognize Panama's sovereignty over the Canal Zone.[7]

On September 24, 1965, Johnson gave a progress report, saying that, after 18 months of negotiations, the U.S. and Panama had decided to abolish the 1903 treaty, replacing it with a new one which would recognize Panama's sovereignty over the Canal Zone and permit "political, economic, and social integration" of the Zone into the Republic of Panama. The new treaty will also provide for a new sea-level canal across Panama—if the commission studying the problem decides that Panama is the best place for a new canal.[8]

Johnson says he thinks the new sea-level canal being planned can be built on the site of the present Canal; but he promises that Panama will receive "adequate compensation for any economic damage suffered" if the new canal is built elsewhere. The implication of this promise is enormous. Panama's two largest cities—Colon and Panama City, at the Pacific and Atlantic terminals of the Panama Canal—will die if a bigger Canal is built elsewhere. Johnson's promise of "adequate compensation" can mean nothing less than putting Panama's two major cities on the American dole forever.[9]

On October 7, 1965, Diogenes de la Rosa (an admitted marxist who is Panama's negotiator in treaty talks with the U.S.) spoke to the Panama National Assembly, giving Panama's official reaction to the promises President Johnson had made on September 24. De la Rosa said that Panama's objective is "a Panamanian canal in Panamanian territory under the Panamanian flag." He acknowledged that in 1964, Panama's direct income from the Canal was $115.4 million, which generated activities totaling another $233 million for Panama. This income derived from the Panama Canal Zone was 39% of the Republic of Panama's gross national product ($578.8 million)—a "fearful figure," de la Rosa said.[10]

Panama demands that the U.S. continue to supply technology, expeirence, and money to operate the Canal, but under Panamanian direction and sovereignty, guaranteeing to Panama whatever economic benefits Panama feels she should receive. Panama also demands that we pay for the privilege of rendering such vital services to Panama by: (1) constructing another bridge across the Canal—this one on the Atlantic side; (2) providing ports, piers, and auxiliary installations for the cities of Panama and Colon; (3) improving and expanding our facilities for furnishing sanitary water to the Republic of Panama; (4) providing short-range and long-range "training of Panamanians in all occupations." [10] In other words, they want us to pay for a poverty program that will embrace the total population of Panama.

On February 3, 1966, Dr. Arnulfo Arias (former President of Panama who was defeated by Marco A. Robles in 1964) said the Panamanian people will accept no treaty with the U.S. which is negotiated by the Robles administration. Asked whether he would support a Robles-negotiated treaty that conformed with his own position, Arias said, facetiously:

"If the treaty is very good—if they give us a few little things like New York City—we accept it." [11]

When the January, 1964, riots erupted in Panama, a propaganda campaign *against* the Panama Canal erupted in the United States. The theme of the campaign was that the Panama Canal, great in its time but now inadequate and obsolete, should be replaced with a larger sea-level canal. On September 2, 1964, Congress hastily passed a bill appropriating a large amount of tax money for studies of sea-level canal alternatives to the present Canal.[12]

The propaganda (preparing Americans to accept without protest the giveaway of one of their most valuable possessions, by convincing them it is no longer useful) does not recognize, much less answer, the critical question: If our government will not hold on to the Panama Canal which it has owned and operated for 52 years, will our government protect a multi-billion-dollar investment in a new canal?

Surrendering our Canal Zone territory and giving away our present Canal will whet foreign appetites for more. If we build a new canal (in Panama or elsewhere in Central America) the nation that provides the right-of-way will demand full sovereignty and ownership.

In all Central American nations where a sea-level canal might be built, general political instability is so commonpalce, and communist influence so strong, that a canal operated under *any* authority except the *exclusive* authority of the Untied States would be a detriment, not an asset, to our nation.

From the day the Republic of Panama was born, her economy has revolved around benefits provided by the United States. Her military security, and the health of her people, depend on us. Our treatment of Panama has *always* been magnanimous. Our only disservice to that nation has resulted from our government's efforts to comply with the outrageous demands of Panama politicians—thus encouraging them to keep their country in turmoil, making it profitable for them to play politics with the "yankee imperialism" propaganda of communism.

The treaty of 1903—the birth certificate of the Republic of Panama—did not give us too much in comparison with what Panama got.

When we acquired right to build the Canal, we accepted responsibility to maintain, operate, and defend it. A vulnerable, critically-important, ten-mile-wide strip of land such as the Canal Zone cannot be easily defended by military bases confined within the strip itself. Our government did not insist on a

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Footnotes at end of article.

ABM file

wider Canal Zone in 1903, because the Treaty gave us the right to *acquire any property anywhere in Panama* which might be needed for operation, sanitation, or defense of the Canal.

In the treaty of 1936–39 and in the treaty of 1955, the Republic of Panama promised to cooperate in every way feasible to demonstrate mutual understanding and cooperation between the two countries and to strengthen bonds of understading and friendship between their respective peoples.

Panama has blatantly and continuously violated the expressed intent of both treaties. Hence, we should declare both treaties null and void. We should return to the terms of the original treaty of 1903, and enforce them meticulously, with the military might of our nation if necessary.

The present Panama Canal is not obsolete. It is too small for a few of our aircraft carriers, but will handle most of our naval craft and commercial vessels. We should keep the Canal, as well as the Zone surrounding it, exclusively under our jurisdiction and control, making whatever improvements *our* national interests may require. We do not need the consent or approval of Panama. All we need is an aroused and determined public which will compel our government to assert our national rights.

Suggestion: Begin *now* demanding that Congress stop spending tax money on plans for a new transisthmian canal. Begin *now* bombarding U.S. Senators with demands that the Senate reject the new U.S.-Panama treaty when President Johnson submits it.

FOOTNOTES

[1] "La Crosse Man, Caught in Panama Riots, Writes Home," by Don Athnos, *The La Crosse Tribune,* January 30, 1964, p. 1 and the editorial page

[2] "Johnson Talk on Panama," *The New York Times,* January 24, 1964, p. 13.

[3] "Texts on Panama Accord," *The New York Times,* April 4, 1964, p. 2

[4] "Humble Pie," editorial, *The Dallas Morning News,* April 28, 1964, Sec. 4, p. 2

[5] "RP Needs Bigger Role in PC, Alliance Says," *Panama American,* July 10, 1964, p. 1

[6] "Shift Zonians To RP, Levy Taxes, RP Asks," *Panama American,* July 15, 1964, p. 1

[7] "U.S. Decides To Dig A New Canal At Sea Level In Latin America and Renegotiate Panama Pact," by Tad Szulc, *The New York Times,* December 19, 1964, pp. 1, 10

[8] "U.S. to Scrap 1903 Treaty With Panama," by Mike Quinn, *The Dallas Morning News,* September 25, 1965, p. 1

[9] "U.S. Giving Up Canal," by Michael Pakenham and Jules DuBois, *Chicago Tribune,* September 25, 1965, pp. 1, 2

[10] "RP's Sweeping Treaty Agenda Revealed," *Star & Herald* (English-language newspaper published in Panama), October 8, 1965, pp. 1, 8

[11] "Arias Says Government Lacks Support To Get Treaty Passed," *Star & Herald,* February 4, 1966, p. 1 ff.

[12] Help! Save The Panama Canal," by Harold Lord Varney, *American Opinion* reprint, March, 1965, 16 pp.

(Mr. PICKLE (at the request of Mr. STUCKEY) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. PICKLE'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

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A DAY TO REMEMBER

(Mr. RODINO (at the request of Mr. STUCKEY) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.).

Mr. RODINO. Mr. Speaker, last December 5 was a landmark day in the history of Montclair, N.J. For it was on that day that Lt. Col. Edwin E. (Buzz) Aldrin returned to his hometown to receive a hero's welcome. There were numerous difficulties in arranging a reception for this courageous American astronaut, but I am proud to say the citizens of Montclair met the challenge with superb ability and speed. I would like to include in the RECORD an editorial from the Montclair Times of December 15 commenting on this historic occasion and the local effort which made possible this unforgettable event. As the editorial concludes, it was "a day which showed that this community, given a good reason and a sound purpose, can do a matchless job."

The editorial follows:

A DAY TO REMEMBER

In its constant effort for perfection, Montclair has never come closer than it did on Dec. 5 when Lieutenant Colonel Edwin E. (Buzz) Aldrin returned home as the principal figure in a welcome whose size and warmth surprised even him.

There were all sorts of potential obstacles when the idea was first broached by Commissioner Theodore MacLachlan who became chairman of the committee in charge. There was no assurance, for instance, that Buzz would be allowed to take the time for a hometown visit. Later, when the assurance arrived, the date was problematical. When the date was finally fixed, the time was short. In addition, Montclair had never done anything quite like it.

But Montclair's citizenry has talent, experienced talent, willing talent. This talent went to work with unstinting effort. Montclair's citizenry has warmth and pride in its own. Both were shown on Dec. 5, beyond any question.

The crowning touch was the honored guest, himself. He is an astronaut to the world, a lieutenant colonel to the Air Force, a doctor of philosophy to Massachusetts Institute of Technology. But to friends and associates of his boyhood he was, and will ever remain, Buzz.

Dec. 5 was a day Montclair will forever remember. Not only was it a day when one of its own sons was honored, but a day which showed that this community, given a good reason and a sound purpose, can do a matchless job.

NEED TO REVISE SELECTIVE SERVICE LAW—III

(Mr. KASTENMEIER (at the request of Mr. STUCKEY) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Speaker, the Defense Department has been caught between the long range need to tailor the military to the increased technological demands of warfare in a nuclear age and a flooding manpower pool. Military strategy and tactics are continually undergoing radical changes in anticipation of future developments. The machinery of modern defense is increasingly becoming fantastically more intricate and technical, and the weapons systems of the present age are regarded as but a passing stage in the headlong rush to technological discovery. America's defense is now so complex, its demands for highly skilled and specialized manpower so great, that the old-fashioned conscript army, in which many men serve short terms of duty, is becoming less and less suited to the needs of modern arms and it is becoming more and more expensive to maintain. The mission of the Defense Department is to make the National Defense Establishment as efficient as possible. Yet, strangely enough, the principles and practices which guide the recruitment, motivation, compensation, and development of men have not changed substantially or kept pase with other changes over the years.

The principles upon which our military conscription are based have not received a public airing since 1951. Congress has not been willing to take the responsibility of trying new approaches to manpower procurement, or, for the most part, even admit that the situation now may be too complex to rely upon a conscription policy developed primarily for a total mobilization situation. It has been clear for some time, however, that the inequities arising from the present law have bred dissatisfaction and cynicism.

There have been, in the past, too many piecemeal investigations of the military manpower problem. If there is to be an improvement upon the allocation of our human resources, we must devote more thought and study to our present and future needs. Congress should start now to anticipate tomorrow's difficulties with an extensive and comprehensive study of the procurement policies and needs of the Military Establishment.

ARE WE ON THE BRINK OF ANOTHER ARMS RACE?

(Mr. BINGHAM (at the request of Mr. STUCKEY) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, undoubtedly one of the main issues in the foreign policy field to confront the 90th Congress will be the question of whether the United States should promptly embark on the deployment of the antiballistic missile system.

My own conviction is that we should find some other way to respond to the reports that the Soviets have begun to construct such a system. Quite possibly, this is an area where our effort should be concentrated on seeking to slow down the arms race by including the question of antiballistic systems in the agenda of our arms control discussions. The alternative would seem to be for us to embark, at enormous expense, on a new phase of the arms race, which is likely in the long run, to provide increased, rather than lessened danger, of a nuclear holocaust.

Yesterday the New York Times magazine contained a most interesting discussion of the subject by Roswell L. Gilpatric, of New York, who served as Under Secretary of the Air Force under President Truman and President Eisenhower and as Deputy Secretary of Defense under President Kennedy and President Johnson. This well-reasoned article is, I believe, worth careful study by all those who have an interest in this most vital issue.

I insert it herewith:

ARE WE ON THE BRINK OF ANOTHER ARMS RACE?

(By Roswell L. Gilpatric)

For many people, the idea of an "arms race" acquired its sinister connotation some 20 years ago with the beginning of the nuclear-weapons age. Yet in fact rivalry in arms, even in its earlier and simpler manifestations, has alway been a bane of mankind. Whenever two nations have found themselves in competition to develop, produce and deploy new arms, the results have been to divert national energy, resources and time from peaceful uses, to exacerbate relations between those nations in other fields by engendering fear and distrust, and, above all, to provide the ingredients of easily ignited conflict.

Notwithstanding the almost universal desire to contain competitive armament struggles, our generation has never been free of them. Since World War II the United States has gone through two cycles of competition with the Soviet Union in strategic armaments, and the signs are multiplying that we may be on the brink of engaging in still another arms race.

The first step-up in U.S. armaments after World War II grew out of Soviet actions and attitudes during the Berlin blockade of 1948–49 and the general intransigence of the Stalin regime on all international-security issues. When it became evident that the United States would have to provide itself with a strategic deterrent against Soviet aggressiveness, a decision was taken in the early nineteen-fifties to develop and produce a post-war generation of medium- and long-range jet bombers, first the subsonic B-47's and B-52's and later the supersonic B-58's. These manned-bomber programs were paralleled by other major technological advances, such as the development of more compact nuclear weapons through improvement in the yield-to-weight ratio of atomic warheads, and also by the production of jet tankers and the introduction of air-refueling techniques to make it possible for our bomber fleets to reach the heartland of Russia.

The Soviets reacted in two ways. First, they developed their own fleet of medium- and long-range bombers, the so-called Bears and Bisons; second, they installed elaborate defensive systems consisting of wide belts of antiaircraft cannon and missile emplacements supplemented by large fleets of interceptor aircraft.

These moves, in turn, led to extensive U.S. countermeasures, including the establishment of a far-flung radar network, known as the Distant Early Warning Line, whose outer perimeter extended from Alaska across the northern reaches of Canada to Greenland, Picket ships and plane-borne radar extended the bomber-warning systems along both the East and West Coasts. The U.S. also set up, under joint command with Canada, numerous air-defense centers consisting of fighter aircraft and antibomber surface-to-air missiles. Finally, to tie together all of the elements in this vast complex for the defense of North America, there was installed during the mid-nineteen-fifties what was called the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) system.

All these offensive and defensive measures cost the U.S. many billions of dollars before much of the equipment involved was rendered obsolete by the advancing state of the military art.

From the start of the first post-World War II arms race, fundamental differences became apparent in the Soviet and U.S. responses to each other's strategic-weapons programs. The U.S. sought to emphasize and to invest more of its resources in offensive capabilities, whereas the Soviets have always stressed defensive measures. In consequence, as the Russians built up stronger defenses, the U.S. added to the numbers of its strategic forces and provided them with the capacity to penetrate Soviet defenses. At the same time we learned that beyond a certain level of defense, the cost advantage lies increasingly with offense.

The next lap in the arms race, beginning in the late fifties and continuing into the early sixties, was characterized chiefly by a partial shift from manned bombers to ballistic missiles, in both offensive and defensive roles, and by improved intelligence through satellite-based reconnaissance about what the other power was up to. After what at first appeared to be, but never in fact materialized as, an early Soviet lead—the so-called "missile gap" of 1950 and 1960—the U.S. forged ahead in both the quantity and the quality of its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's).

Quickly on the heels of the first generation, liquid-fueld Atlas and Titan missiles, launched from "soft"—that is, vulnerable—land-based sites, came the Minuteman and Polaris families of ICBM's solid-fueled and fired either from "hardened"—protected—underground silos or underwater from submarines. With a force desined soon to comprise 1,000 Minutemen and 656 Polaris missiles, U.S. ICBM's have consistently outnumbered the Soviet missile force by a ratio of 3 or 4 to 1. Moreover, for some time Soviet missiles were of less advanced types, being liquid-fueled and deployed in soft or semiprotected sites and hence vulnerable to attack.

During this same period of the early nineteen-sixties, both U.S. and Soviet defenses against bomber attacks were strengthened by the development and installation of successively improved models of surface-to-air missiles of which, characteristically, the Soviets deployed by far the greatest number. To cope with toughter Soviet defenses, U.S. bombers were modified to carry air-launched missiles in addition to gravity bombs and were equipped with electronic countermeasures to confuse Russian radar.

Both sides began developing antiballistic missile (ABM) systems, but it was only toward the end of 1966 that our Government acknowledged publicly that the Soviets had moved from the development stage to the quantity production and deployment of ABM's. In contrast, the U.S. has kept its ABM effort at the engineering design and development level and continued to place its principal reliance on the capacity of its strategic-weapons-delivery systems, whether bombers or missiles, to penetrate any type of Soviet defense, no matter how sophisticated.

After the Russians had been stood down during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and had reached an accord with the U.S. for a partial test ban treaty in 1963, it appeared that the Soviets might accept the then-existing military equation with the U.S. and not challenge us to another round in the strategic arms race.

For a period after the present Soviet leadership headed by Brezhnev and Kosygin took over from Khrushchev, it seemed to be Soviet policy to seek a *détente* with the U.S. Our Government therefore felt safe in leveling off its strategic forces at least until the time—not expected before 1975–80—when the Chinese Communists might develop their own nuclear weapons to the point of being able to threaten the continental United States.

As 1966 drew to a close, however, the American people were told that not only were the Soviets proceeding with a comprehensive installation of ABM's, but in addition were setting out to build a larger force of solid-fueled and invulnerably sited ballistic missiles. Such a build-up might, it was indicated, reach a point, beginning in 1968, where the U.S. strategic force of some 1,650 Minutemen and Polaris missiles would no longer enjoy its present overwhelming margin of superiority.

It thus became apparent that, in determining how to respond to these new developments, the U.S. is once again facing the possibility of a stepped-up arms race with the Soviet Union of even more critical and dangerous proportions than the two previous cycles.

As he reviews the coming year's military proposals and budgets, President Johnson is therefore confronted with some hard choices regarding new weapons systems. Among them are the following:

(1) Should the U. S. now produce and deploy, either on a full or limited scale, an antiballistic missile system? The current version is known as the Nike X (consisting of two nuclear-tipped interceptor missiles, one short-range called Sprint and the other extended-range, the improved Zeus), supplemented with large numbers of a new high-performance interceptor aircraft, the F–12, and an extensive Civil Defense program for providing on a nationwide scale fallout shelter protection.

(2) Or should the U. S. instead rely for the maintenance of its "second strike" strategic deterrent on a new generation of ICBM's consisting of Minuteman III and Poseidon missiles, together referred to as Improved Capability Missiles (ICM's)—with the capacity to penetrate or saturate the new Soviet missile defenses?

(3) Should the U.S., in addition to procuring the new ICM's, equip its Air Force with quantities of an Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA) to take over the bomber role from the aging B–52 fleet and ultimately from the new supersonic jet bomber, the B–111, that will become operational a few years hence?

A go-ahead decision on the first, or the first and third, of these proposals will signalize a U. S. determination to do the Soviet Union one better in a new struggle for world power through force of arms and to base its relations with the Soviets more on a philosophy of conflict than on one of accommodation. Let us first consider the military implications of such a choice.

Defense Secretary McNamara states that the currently planned U.S. offensive force of missiles and bombers was specifically designed to hedge against several different contingencies, including the possibilities "first, that a Soviet ballistic-missile defense might be greater than expected by the intelligence estimates; and, second, that the Soviets might embark upon any one of several possible offensive build-ups, including variations in their target doctrine, variation in the technological sophistication of their weapons systems, and variations in the speed of deployment of those systems."

In thus taking into account possible Soviet threats over and beyond those projected in the latest national intelligence estimates, Secretary McNamara explains that "we have done so because an assured destruction capability, a capability to survive the first strike and survive with sufficient power to destroy the attacker, is the vital first objective which must be met in full regardless of the cost under all foreseeable circumstances and regardless of any difficulties involved."

His position is that, with the development of Minuteman III, the accelerated development of the Poseidon missile and moving ahead on new penertation aids to insure our weapons getting through any defenses the Soviets may put in place, the U.S. has in effect anticipated and insured against the latest moves by the Soviet Union. Notwithstanding a Russian ABM system and more and better Soviet ICBM's, he concludes that the U.S. strategic forces will continue to maintain their present power to survive a Soviet first strike with sufficient capability to destroy the attacker, which is the foundation of the deterrent power upon which our national security depends.

The conclusions of the Secretary of Defense are being severely questioned in a number of quarters. In the first place, there are indications that most of the professional military organization, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on down, believes that the United States should go ahead with both production and deployment of an ABM system and also with a new generation of manned bombers as well as the new ICM's.

This military judgment will find strong support in the Congress, especially among the influential leaders of the Armed Forces committees, and will be backed by substantial sectors of public opinion, particularly in the South and on the Republican right. There is also likely to be considerable pressure from segments of the defense industry, backed by the communities that would benefit from increased armament production, for this nation to embark on a new round of strategic weapons building. It is possible that the Secretary of Defense's position may not enjoy undivided support even within the Johnson Administration.

But apart from the military implications of these new weapons choices, there are a number of political and economic issues which, so far as the public knows, may not have been fully considered.

If the U.S. decides to install ABM's to protect its population, should such systems also be placed in Europe, and if so, will not the countries on the other side of the Iron Curtain respond in kind? In that event, will the ABM's be furnished to our allies by ourselves, and to the bloc countries by the Soviets, and at whose cost?

Will our action to go ahead with an ABM deployment play into the hands of the Communist Chinese efforts to disrupt U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations? How far will we and the Soviets go beyond ABM's in building active defenses when the costs involved are measured by tens of billions of dollars, with enormous strategic implications and a long-lasting political impact?

The effects would be felt especially in Europe but also, as Communist Chinese nuclear capabilities develop, in India, Japan and other countries on the periphery of the Chinese mainland.

A new arms race will produce other casualties. Besides the hoped-for nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaty, toward which the Soviets and the U.S. have of late been making progress, there have long been under discussion between Russian and American disarmament negotiators a series of other arms-control measures. These include the extension of the partial test ban to include underground testing, the establishment of nuclear-free zones, a cut-off in the production of nuclear materials and a freeze on—or possibly a reduction in—strategic delivery vehicles.

In the event of a new arms race, all this effort, and the partial foundations thereby constructed for further disarmament moves, will go by the board, and whatever headway has been built up, both at the U.N. and in the 18-nation disarmament conference at Geneva, will be lost. Indeed, even if the Soviet Union and the U.S. should in their own interests come to terms on a nonproliferation treaty, it is hardly to be expected that the major nuclear have-not nations, such as India and Japan, will sign away their rights to join the nuclear club at a time when its two charter members, Russia and the U.S., are building up rather than cutting down their nuclear arsenals.

Still another danger inherent in a renewed arms race lies in its short-term effect in Europe. For the U.S. to press ahead with a new strategic armament program would further weaken the NATO alliance, whose last meeting in Paris stressed the twin themes of *détente* with the Soviet Union and the "diminished threat of military aggression" rather than the need for greater defensive measures. The alliance already under strain because of our allies' concern over the heavy U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war, would suffer another blow if U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations took a turn for the worse.

In approaching its decisions, the Administration will presumably take into account positive as well as negative emanations from the Soviet Union. Among the favorable developments in U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations are the recently announced agreements for commercial air services between the two countries and for banning weapons of mass destruction from outer space.

Apart from their intrinsic significance, these developments indicate that the Soviet Union has not considered itself entirely inhibited from reaching agreements with the U.S. despite its predicament over Vietnam. This condition cannot, however, be expected to last if the Soviets feel themselves put in the position of countenancing U.S. bombing raids in the Hanoi area which produce civilian casualties. Undoubtedly, the present state of U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations would rapidly worsen if a significant intensification occurred in the scale of our air attacks against North Vietnam.

At worst, Soviet intentions regarding a renewed arms race should be treated as ambivalent and unclear rather than entirely negative. Their ABM deployment can be accounted for otherwise than as indicating a desire to alter the strategic power balance. It not only is in keeping with the ultimate in defensive postures but may also have resulted from military pressures within the Soviet regime rather than from a far-reaching decision to abandon the *détente* objective.

The latest increase in the Soviet defense budget is likewise equivocal. The announced rate of increase, 8.2 per cent, is not in itself of menacing proportions, although in announcing the rise in defense spending the Soviet authorities spoke of "recently sharpened international tensions" and the increased "danger of a new world war" because of "aggressive acts" of U.S. "imperialists."

Aside from these vital questions affecting international relations, the effect on our economy of a U.S. decision to proceed with ABM deployment and new strategic weapons would be tremendous. Depending on the timing and extent of these programs, the U.S. defense budget would be inflated by at least $5-billion to $6-billion a year, with the probable result that the present level of military expenditure, which will stay in the $70-billion to $75-billion-a-year range during the period of the Vietnam war, would thereafter remain at that order of magnitude instead of receding to the pre-Vietnam budget level of around $50-billion a year.

The effect of this Federal spending and diversion of national resources might well be to reduce or delay further funding of U.S. space and supersonic transport programs as well as to forestall further financing of the Great Society programs such as antipoverty projects, Federal aid to education, demonstration cities and the like.

It is not, however, the economic cost of a decision to deploy ABM's as well as to all to the level of our bomber and missile forces that is the most disturbing aspect of a renewed arms race. With the U.S. gross national product estimated to rise to $790 billion during 1967 and to grow at 4 per cent a year thereafter, projecting defense expenditure at 9 per cent of G.N.P. (compared to 15 per cent of G.N.P. during the Korean War) would produce a defense budget of over $70-billion a year, which should not prove an intolerable burden on our economy. The price tag of another arms race, while staggering, is not in itself an argument against it.

What the United States faces is a major watershed in national security policy. Should it re-engage in an armament contest with the Soviet Union, or should it strive for more progress toward arms control and the substitution of political, economic and sociological measures for military force as means for insuring world peace?

In these terms, the question comes down to how the United States will exercise its acknowledged strength and world leadership—whether toward heightening the tension that will come from renewed emphasis on armaments and accelerated advances in weapons technology or in the direction of arms limitation and the solution of world problems through peaceful means.

Should the decision be reached during 1967 to proceed with any of the major new weapons systems now being pressed upon the President by some of his advisers, their opposite numbers in the Soviet would obviously be in a stronger position to insist on corresponding increases in Russian weapons projects.

The reaction in political terms would be even more dangerous, jeopardizing not only the *détente* so ardently sought after by our allies but also the fragile gains achieved through Soviet restraint in recent years in such troubled areas of the world as Africa, Latin America and on the India-Pakistan subcontinent.

The decisions which the President now faces are made doubly difficult by the national mood of frustration over the way the war is going in Vietnam. All-to-ready distrust of the Soviets' intentions, coupled with anger at their growing aid to Vietnam, would prompt many of our people to view with suspicion or antagonism a national policy of forbearance in dealing with the Soviet Union. For others, an effort to moderate the competition in arms would be regarded as a sign of weakness and a peril to our national security.

Yet President Johnson has recognized, as did President Kennedy, that if a third world war is to be avoided the United States, as the most advanced of the superpowers, must take the lead in demonstrating a willingness to practice self-discipline both in the use of force and in providing itself with the power to apply force. The present situation puts to a critical test our national determination not to be swerved from the rightness and sanity of that course.

REPORT ON VIETNAM

(Mr. BINGHAM (at the request of Mr. STUCKEY) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, early last December my wife and I visited Vietnam for almost a week. I sent back to the weekly newspapers in my district two reports on this visit, as follows:

LETTER FROM SAIGON, DECEMBER 1966

We are leaving Vietnam today, after almost a week here, and, believe it or not, we are sorry to leave. We have met scores, perhaps hundreds, of Vietnamese and Americans that we liked and admired. They are working well together and they believe